

Professional Hoops

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Published in *Affiliations: Identity in Academic Cultures*. Ed. Jeffrey R. DiLeo. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P 75-88.

As I write, the sports pages feature discussions about the National Basketball Association player draft. The focal issue concerns the many high school seniors who have skipped college in order to enter this prestigious professional league, considered the world over to be the ideal place to play basketball. Every year, a large number of high school kids and college underclassmen declare that they wish to be regarded as eligible for the NBA draft. Though only a handful of these aspirants ever make it to the NBA, nonetheless many teenagers believe that they can achieve this ideal status. The situation is remarkable but understandably human. Encouraged by the media, kids wish to be like the professional athletes they see on tv. For every high school kid who makes it, though, countless others never realize their dreams.

The 1994 film *Hoop Dreams* documents a year in the lives of two young men who aspired to play in the NBA—one who realized his dream, another who didn't. The film's title plays ironically with the many hoops one must jump through in order to play hoops in the NBA. Two young men are followed through high school, beginning with their participation in playground games and ending with their being recruited by colleges. The obstacles these young men face include parental drug addiction, family poverty, and inner-city violence as well as the usual obstacles that arise in competition, including physical injuries. While each aspires to leave the ghetto, there are many reasons to suppose that they may not succeed, despite each beating the odds against him by winning a college scholarship.' The pattern aspirants share can be described as stages in the development of a self-image: affiliation, imitation, aspiration, competition. First one affiliates with a cultural representation of a possible self (e.g., Michael Jordan), then one imitates his practices; if successful, this sets up a disposition to achieve

his status, which in turn drives one to compete for the prestige one's ideal achieved.

With the all-powerful image of Michael Jordan presiding over the film, *Hoop Dreams* exposes the way in which basketball has become the dominant force in the lives of so many African American young men who rely on their athletic skills to rise above the poverty surrounding them in a society that values only what these boys can do on the court. Brilliantly elucidating a journey of lost innocence, in which the casualties of a game mean much more than simply losing on the court, the film earned awards from the Sundance Film Festival, the New York Film Critics Circle, and the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.'

I believe that a similar motivational structure shapes persons who aspire to be university professors. In *Token Professionals and Master Critics: A Critique of Orthodoxy in Literary Studies, I* introduced the figure of "the ideal professor" to explain why faculty in English departments continue to labor in circumstances so far removed from any that might be construed as ideal. The *Magister Implicatus* was my configuration for the ideal professor. My hypothesis was that, like the kids in *Hoop Dreams*, ordinary members of the professoriate are motivated by the belief that someday they too will embody the ideal they cherish and admire.

AFFILIATION AS A HUMAN MOTIVE

When Jeffrey R. Di Leo asked me to rethink *Token Professionals*, I was sitting in on a colleague's course in cognitive psychology. That course led me to read *Human Motivation*, in which David McClelland describes four complexes of motives: needs to achieve, to have power, to avoid painful circumstances, and to affiliate. As I began to think about the concept of affiliation, it occurred to me that the psychology of motivation would be very fertile ground in which to replant, so to speak, the idea of the *Magister Implicatus*.

To replant this idea effectively, I need to dig a little deeper and call attention to another characteristic of the *Magister*: he is infinitely interpretable. Like literary characters who have become emblems of types of behavior, the *Magister* functions analogically. Even though the persons who identify with the *Magister* differ widely from one another, they nonetheless feel that they resemble a prototype or, if you prefer, archetype. This is the realm of mythos. Archetypes like the *Magister* function as characters in the mental maps of the world sometimes called personal histories. In what follows I relate the *Magister* to a common motivational pattern—the need to affiliate. Affiliation is then related to other motivational systems, namely

achievement and power motives. I end by rearticulating the conclusion of *Token Professionals and Master Critics* in a discussion of a collaborative mode of study engendered by a disposition to affiliate with persons rather than with representations like the *Magister*.

CONFIGURATIONS ARE MODELS FOR BEHAVIOR

We are creatures of habit. Most of the activities that form the routines of everyday life are habitual. We don't stop to think about brushing our teeth, taking a shower, driving to work, or reaching for a salt shaker. As Roger Schank persuasively argues, our behavior is guided by the various scripts of everyday situations that we have stored in our memories—for example, going to a restaurant. Like scripts in a play or film, there are typical roles for actors to play in specific scenes. Different situations call for different interactions and different roles. In these scripts our personae act out various scenarios or configurations. Casts of characters with whom we interact populate our scripts.

Scripts are models of behavior in typical situations. The characters in the cast with whom our self-image interacts are also typical, if not stereotypical. These characters are composites of all the actual experiences we have of a given situation. They are very much like Vladimir Propp's "dramatis personae" in *The Morphology of the Folktale*, known by their function in the narrative structure rather than by their unique traits. For this reason, they can be called *archetypes*—the term is from a Greek word meaning "stamp." When we encounter a situation we typify it by assimilating it into our cognitive framework. In this sense, we stamp it as received as such and such.

Outside the vocabularies inspired by Jung's work, in everyday discourse an archetype is usually understood as a model or type after which other similar things are patterned; a prototype. It can also be understood as an ideal example of a type; its quintessence. As idealized or exemplary types, archetypes play a role in what are commonly called mental "scripts." In these scripts, others are configured as archetypes—the prototypical maitre d' or the prototypical arrogant sommelier.

When we apply these mental models to our experience, we are in effect recalling an analogous process that compares the mental model to a new experience and draws the conclusion that it is analogous. The process is largely unconscious (in the way that many habitual activities are largely unconscious) and, as such, can be understood in its repetitive character as "recognition." When we encounter a situation, we recognize it as a typical one that we have encountered before. This process of recognition via the

recall of a previous analogy I termed *configuring* in *Token Professionals*, although I did not relate it in that text to cognitive psychology.

Configurations are sequences of interpersonal interactions stored in our memory banks as typical situations in everyday life. They carry with them any number of expectations, for example, that the personae in these scenarios will function "in character." As you may begin to suspect, scripts cluster around each other and form maps of the world of our experience or, perhaps more familiarly, as worldviews that are the basis of our belief systems. Some of these scripts involve "affiliations" in McClelland's sense. Romantic scenarios—falling in love, for instance—are among the roost common in McClelland's view. Such configurations are easy to imagine and readily understandable. It is more difficult to understand how people affiliate with abstract entities like institutions. Generally speaking, I believe, institutional affiliation becomes possible through the identification of exemplary figures who embody the virtues the institution values. For example, Christianity is represented by the figure of Christ; Buddhism by the figure of Buddha, and so on. In instances such as Michael Jordan as a personification of the NBA, one needs to keep in mind that the actual person is idealized and that, over a period of time, various exemplary figures are merged into an archetypal configuration. (This tendency is sometimes graphically represented in sport magazines, where an idealized basketball or football player is given the attributes of several exemplars—the arm of John Elway, the brain of Joe Montana, the elusiveness of Kordall Stewart.) In *Token Professionals* I argued that in their affiliation with the institution of criticism, critics employ the archetype of the Magister Implicatus in their mental maps of institutional life.

Since our need to affiliate, from a psychological point of view, is derived from our need for contact with other human beings, it is not surprising that our emotions can be evoked by institutions when they are personified. If we take the NBA to be an instance of the professionalization and institutionalization of the game of basketball, then we can understand why the media personifies the NBA by marketing scenarios that feature figures such as Michael Jordan. In the recent crisis in the NBA—falling revenues and TV ratings—the problem is often related by commentators to the retirement of Michael Jordan and his generation of "stars" and the difficulty of replacing him with figures like Allen Iverson, whose tattooed body and antisocial rap lyrics make it unlikely that a middle-class audience will affiliate with the NBA as they did with Michael Jordan, Larry Bird, and similar figures who represented the institution of basketball in previous years. Businesses also have their stars. The legendary figures of entrepreneurs form a pantheon of

archetypes from Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford to Ted Turner and Bill Gates.

It is appropriate to call it a pantheon because these figures are represented in various media, not with respect to unique personality traits but rather as demigods, as generalized ideals or exemplars. The Michael Jordan of TV commercials is an idealized representation of the person. Occasionally, hints of the person surface in the news—in Jordan's case, his trip to gamble on the Jersey shore before a playoff game in New York—and clash with the archetypal representation. However, the fact that Jordan is an actual person lends credence to the possibility that persons who wish to imitate him can do so. Were God not incarnated in the person of Christ, he would be a much more difficult figure with whom to affiliate.

Professions that have been institutionalized, like that of literary criticism, have their pantheon as well. We are regularly informed of the most recently canonized critics by the publication of textbooks, such as the recently published *Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, delineating how they function as critics, making them imitable—that is, exemplary—figures. As in the case of Michael Jordan, these figures are idealized as representative figures, "master critics," but the fact that they are also real persons makes it creditable that others may follow in their footsteps. Just as we noted in the case of the young men aspiring to play in the NBA and "be like Mike," the vast majority of aspirants to the status of master critics achieve only the status of token professionals, playing semipro ball. Yet, the ideal of becoming a master critic, whom I have personified as the Magister Implicatus, remains inscribed ("*in-scripted*") in our mental model of the institution of criticism and guides our behavior.

My intention in this essay is to locate my theory of orthodoxy in the context of recent psychological theories of motivation. Hence I turn now to the need to affiliate with other persons as a prevalent motive in our behavior and discuss the ways in which this need for human contact can be satisfied by affiliation with an institution which is personified in its exemplary members, representing them as virtual archetypes who incarnate its social functions.

AFFILIATION SERVES A BASIC NEED

In his *Human Motivation* David McClelland argues that the need to affiliate is one of the basic motive dispositions enjoyed by human beings. He writes: "People appear to have a basic need or desire to be with other people, just as most animals prefer to be with other members of their species. Part of the need is sexual in origin and biologically adaptive because the two sexes must

get together in order to reproduce the species. The need to affiliate with others includes sexual contacts, but it is much broader, including various types of emotional interpersonal attachments that may grow out of natural contact incentives" (334). Presumably, though the basic need is for contact with other persons, emotional attachments that grow out of such "contact incentives" can include emotional attachments to virtual figures represented by various media who stand in for impersonal entities such as institutions. Indeed, the use of the term *affiliation* suggests exactly this possibility since it means to become closely associated not only with persons but also with organizations or institutions, as, for example, when one becomes a member or an employee. It is in this latter sense that Edward Said defines affiliation as an "alternative" to filiation. He writes: "The only other alternative seemed to be provided by institutions, associations, and communities whose social existence was not in fact guaranteed by biology but by affiliation" (*The World*, 17). Later, he remarks: "What I am describing is the transition from a failed idea or possibility of filiation to a kind of compensatory order that, whether it is a party, an institution, a culture, a set of beliefs, or even a world-vision, provides men and women with a new form of relationship, which I have been calling affiliation but which is also a new system" (19). For Said, affiliation to institutions compensates for more basic needs, which, as psychologists argue, begin with the infant's need for maternal contact and develops into needs for filial and sexual intimacy.

In McClland's view, the need to affiliate is strongly related to contact with other persons. I argue that the need to affiliate with another person is transferred to the need to affiliate with an organization, team, or institution through the mediating function of the archetypal or magisterial figures who personify the attitudes associated with the institution. These personae configure the institution and become a way of concretizing the values and beliefs the institution wishes to engender. In this sense, they exemplify the virtues that association with the institution attributes to its members. In turn, by affiliating with an institution, persons indicate that they subscribe to these values. Affiliation with Christianity indicates that the persons involved subscribe to Christlikeness.

In institutional settings, the traits of archetypal or magisterial figures are often attributed to members of the institution. If you go to a Catholic church on Sundays, people will assume you don't use birth control. Similarly, if you have a professorial demeanor and go to a university to work during the week, people will assume that you "have the summers off." Of course, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the situations of most university teachers do not resemble the situations associated with

the professor." And, as we know, the young boy who purchases Nikes quickly learns that his affiliation with Michael Jordan does not necessarily situate him in the NBA. Nonetheless, the numerical disparity between aspirants (thousands) and superstars (a hundred) has not put an end to our need to affiliate with them. Instead, we switch or lower aspirations. If we are fortunate, we return to a need for contact with persons rather than personages.

The process of affiliating with an abstract entity like an institution remains rather obscure. While there is little doubt that persons do affiliate with universities, with departments, with master critics, and with critical schools, little information about the process is available. In *Token*

I describe the various ways in which an idealized representation of the ideal critic, the Magister Implicatus, appears in textbooks, brochures, manuals, and other academic documents. I regard the psychosocial impact of this archetypal figure to be similar to that of religious figures whom various religious institutions claim to embody. This seems a viable hypothesis even though the various superstars or master critics are explicitly subsumed into a single archetype. I think of the exemplary figures as "saints' lives" that testify to their Christlikeness.

The media (saints' lives are publicized) abets the process. *The professor* is a palpable cultural entity who appears in films and TV shows. He has been played by Gary Cooper (*Ball of Fire*), Ronald Reagan (*Bedtime for Bonzo* and *Bonzo Goes to College*), Fred MacMurray (*The Absent-Minded Professor*), and Cary Grant (*Bringing up Baby*), to name some of the more famous actors. In these films, the professor is absentminded, preoccupied with research and ideas rather than people, highly specialized, and profoundly idealistic—in short, completely devoted to the goals of a research institution.

INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING CRITICAL STATUS

One of the puzzling aspects of institutional affiliation is that from a psychological perspective, the persons who are affiliated with the institution of criticism seem to exhibit characteristics of people with a stronger need for achievement or power than for intimacy with other persons. This is, of course, not a scientific observation; nor do I have any empirical evidence for this claim beyond my highly subjective and personal observations. If institutional affiliations parallel religious affiliations, then universities, like religions, foster in their members particular traits that are personified by exemplary figures. It seems fitting, then, that universities foster "excellence." They reward the scholarly achievements of their members. These rewards

are merited competitively. Key issues are debated in public forums where winners and losers are identified. In fact, to enter the public forums one must compete with other aspirants.

In *Token Professionals and Master Critics* I analyzed critical conduct, in particular the theory wars, the falsification and refutation of rivals, and careerism. I do not intend to repeat those analyses here. Rather, I hope to locate my argument in *Token Professionals* in the context of motivational theory. From this perspective, my argument is that institutional affiliation, as a motive, is a subset of an achievement motive. Motivational systems based on achievement incentives are characterized by competition for rewards that signal achievement.

Needless to say, there is abundant evidence in literary criticism that various schools compete with each other in the register of theoretical discourse. There is even more abundant evidence that critics compete with other critics with respect to their interpretations of specific texts. Critical controversies are common in literary criticism and theoretical points of contention can be easily shown to be the cause of many of them. Editions of literary works are often published together with readings of them that feature controversies. Conflicting assumptions are so characteristic of literary studies that histories of criticism are structured by giving accounts of rival schools of thought (see, for example, the Brooks and Wimsatt, Wellek and Warren, Leitch, and Graff works in the bibliography). Intense competition, however, does not foster the intense collaboration one might expect in affiliations. In the next section, I explore this clash of motives beginning with the tension between critical interest in persons, largely readers, and critical interest in texts.

THE TENSION BETWEEN AFFILIATION AND ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVES

In the course of its history, literary criticism has taken as its object of study literature; that is, the sum total of literary texts. It would be quite unusual if not perverse to interpret Shakespeare, the person, rather than his texts. Further, in the institution of criticism, critics are rewarded for their textual achievements rather than for their interpersonal skills. However, what is known about literary texts is often claimed to be valuable because it provides an understanding of persons. I take this claim to be the principle justification of literary criticism. If the primary critical task is to interpret texts, to derive meaning from them, then the meanings so derived have their value because they contribute to our understanding of human beings.

For critics making this claim, the underlying assumption that justifies

their work to the public is that the knowledge of the meaning of texts provides an understanding of persons. This simple assumption can easily be shown to be a complex one, once the knowledge-understanding vector is construed as culture specific. I realize that there are other justifications—literary study provides knowledge of techniques, cultural values, or the human condition. However, all of these results can be shown to be

a way of understanding persons. Techniques, for example, are used to affect persons. Values cannot be divorced from the persons who hold them. The generalizations about persons that are implied by "the human condition" ultimately have to be applied to specific persons for confirmation. Justifications of literary study as entertainment are rarely made even though literature is usually said to provide both edification and enjoyment, but it is easy to relate either one to persons. For the purposes of this essay, taking the justification of literary studies to be a means of understanding persons presents us with another perspective on the way an -which affiliation with the institution of criticism is subordinate to the motive of achievement.

Literary critics can be excellent critics even if their only contact is with texts rather than with persons. The conventional image of scholars commonly associates them with libraries and labs rather than with persons. In the films mentioned earlier, Fred MacMurray, Cary Grant, and Ronald Reagan are torn between their love of their isolated existence as professors and their romantic affiliations with women. The humor in the films derives largely from the peculiarity of the professor archetype, namely his preference for a hermetic lifestyle and his inability to be aroused by romantic cues. While the professors in these films may be parodies of actual professors, literary critics do study texts rather than persons, and they do not require any personal contact with the author of a text, whether that be a poet, a novelist, or another critic. This raises the question: With whom do critics affiliated to the institution of criticism affiliate in that role? As I have earlier indicated, I argue in *Token Professionals* that critics affiliate with the Magister Implicatus, who is an idealized and therefore imaginary figure of the master critic whom they aspire to be. Again, rather than recount the details of the argument here, I will locate it in the context of motivational theory.

McClelland's account of motivational systems involves the following sequence:

- a. demands or arousal cues made in terms of incentives
- b. will, if they contact an existing motive disposition,
- c. lead to aroused motivation,

- d. which combines with cognitions (values), habits, or skills to produce the impulse to act, which combines with opportunities to produce action.

When influenced by a need to affiliate, a person's disposition is to make contact with other persons. Given an appropriate stimulus (arousal cue or incentive), a person with a "motive disposition" to affiliate will become aroused and seek a way to make contact with the other persons in the situation. In the derived instance of an institutional affiliation—in our case, with a university—a person would be aroused by some incentive to make contact with the ideas of a person who personified the disciplinary values of the institution. When a master critic is presented as an ideal critic, in my experience of the academy, it is difficult for many people to be indifferent to that person's work. The impulse to act that is produced by the emotions aroused by reading a master critic is, in my observations of critical conduct, usually an impulse to imitate or to rival that person. Imitation begets critical schools. Exemplary rivalry begets rival schools. If this is an accurate account of critical affiliation with a school or movement, then the achievement of critical status would seem to be the primary motive and affiliation would seem to be a subordinate motive. In my view, this is normal critical conduct.

I argue in *Token Professionals* that such normative conduct occasions—in some, not all academics—a motivational bind. A double bind exists when a person is confronted with two contradictory injunctions, and choosing either would be construed as a wrong choice. For example, when a mother asks her children if they enjoyed a dinner that was badly prepared, the children are more or less forced to lie. Lying would make them feel that they disobeyed their mother's injunction not to lie; but telling the truth—dinner was uneatable—would make them feel bad for hurting their mother's feelings.

The double bind literary critics face, I believe, comes from the institutional injunctions (1) to be a good scholar and (2) to be a good teacher. Conceptually, the two injunctions do *not* contradict each other, and it is axiomatic in the profession to say that scholarship and teaching complement each other—the better the scholar, the better the teacher. However conceptually congruent the two injunctions may be, in the practice of institutional life, the two motive dispositions easily clash. From the perspective of an achievement motive, persons who teach literature should instruct their students to become good critics in the sense that they should learn to derive

meaning from texts in accord with one or more canonical (magisterial) critics. In this scenario, teachers privilege the meaning of the text that matches their sense of "the received opinion." From the perspective of an affiliation motive, persons who teach literature should instruct students in a compassionate and supportive way. In this scenario, students are usually *encouraged* to derive the meaning that accords with their experiences rather than with the received opinion. Thus it is entirely possible that academics may very well find themselves in a motivational bind when their scholarly motives clash with their teacherly motives. The achievement motive is satisfied by reaching a standard of scholarship in accord with the ideal critic who sets the standard. The affiliation motive is satisfied by reaching an understanding of students' difficulties in interpreting obscure texts. The achievement motive rewards students for their ability to perform according to a standard. The affiliation motive rewards students for their ability to make texts meaningful to themselves.

This is one instance of a typical motivational bind members of English departments experience. There are innumerable similar binds that hinge upon the negotiation of the two imperatives: get published, get good student evaluations. The teacher of writing is faced with the dilemma of rewarding Standard English or rewarding interesting prose. The chairperson of an exam committee is faced with the dilemma of assuming an interpretation in the mode of a critical school that may not be the one embraced by the examinee, if indeed the examinee embraces any at all. The awards committee members choose whether they should reward students whose projects are, so to speak, "paradigmatic," or those whose projects are unique or unprecedented. Grant committee members face the same set of decisions. Whereas in most cases the "official" line (achievement measured against disciplinary standards) rules the day in committees, the corridor "lore" usually celebrates the unorthodox manner in which teachers affiliate with their students.

In institutional life, critical achievements that approximate magisterial scholarship are rewarded, and the social processes that accompany affiliation are not. For many literary scholars this is as it should be. In *Token*

I argue that the assumption that literary scholarship can produce knowledge about the human condition or about culture is a problematic one. In *Modern Skeletons in Postmodern Closets*, I develop this position in detail. The gist of the argument is that since literature is fictive, any meaning derived from its study is about possible rather than actual worlds and hence cannot be designated "knowledge" in the sense that refutable

propositions are usually designated. I propose that literary interpretations are configurational arguments, which depend upon analogical rather than logical inferences. Claims made by literary critics for knowledge about persons have few consequences in related disciplines.

My argument in *Skeletons* notwithstanding, even if literary critics did accumulate knowledge about persons, that knowledge would not be equivalent to understanding persons. To take a simple example—the circumstance that you know I am a member of the Unit for New Media Studies in the Communication Department at the University of Illinois at Chicago is not equivalent to understanding me as a person. To understand me as a person, in the sense of Wilhelm Dilthey's conception of *Verstehen*, you have to be "in contact" with me. This observation brings us back to the motivational bind to which I referred earlier. This bind can be articulated in several ways. Consider the following statements: The ineluctably personal is revealed by assuming a systematic impersonal attitude toward it. My impersonal and detached study of texts independent of any contact with the persons related to them results in my understanding of persons as persons. Or my understanding of myself is made possible by the logical inferences I can make about what I say or write.

In *Skeletons*, I analyze literary arguments for their logical consistency, and it should not surprise you that my verdict is echoed in McClelland's reservations about interpretive claims in Freudian psychoanalysis. He writes: "Experimentally oriented psychologists never have been satisfied with hermeneutical demonstrations of psychosexual or psychosocial stages of motivational development . . . they have felt that gifted interpreters could make sense of almost any dream sequence and could manage to find, if they were creative enough, the particular kind of sense they were expecting to find" (60). The process of literary training is designed to produce "gifted interpreters" who learn their craft from master interpreters and achieve status by replacing their masters. It is my contention that literary studies can and should make the motive to achieve subordinate to the motive to affiliate.

BINDS CAN BE UNBOUND

I ended *Token Professionals* with an appeal to my colleagues to shift their modus operandi from competition to collaboration and to reinvent themselves by letting go the impossible task of accumulating knowledge and undertaking the realizable task of imagining alternate cultures. I argued that literary study was not an explanation of the human condition but a delineation of possible ways of being human. I argued for a shift away from

studies of the meaning of texts to an understanding of the social negotiation of cultural possibilities. I believed and still do that the interpretation of literature cannot have a social impact if it is construed as an attempt to derive textual meanings. Contributions from literary critics to our knowledge of the world have to be construed as the discovery of facts about texts. Since facts are considered to be data that can be "observed" in the accounts with which I am familiar, the discovery of meaning by readers seems ineluctably subjective.

In the present essay, I take that argument a step further. In the "re-planting" of an idea in which I have been engaged thus far, a "new" question blossoms: Is it possible to affiliate with an institution without subordinating an affiliative disposition to an achievement motive? At the surface, it seems impossible since most institutions structure the behavior of their members by ranking them with respect to merit; that is, with respect to their achievement of the goals of the institution. Thus, it would seem that any affiliation with an institution has to be subordinate to an achievement motive.

The institution that appears to be an exception to achievement as a governing motive would seem to be the religious one. In religious institutions, achievement is measured in terms of the degree of affiliation. In religious institutions, love is the governing motive rather than money or knowledge. But the history of religious institutions does not confirm this in any obvious way. An observer might be more inclined to infer that love is uninstitutionalizable. After all, the instant you try to measure it, it seems to disappear.

If the answer to my question is that as long as one affiliates with an institution, the achievement motive will be paramount, then a corollary is that some sort of Magister Implicatus will always be the ideal to which you should aspire as well as the template by which you should measure your success. So the issue comes down to: *Whom we idealize as exemplars of our conduct?* It is impossible to answer this question for everyone; however, I cannot help but wonder whether our behavior would be more collaborative if our representative heroes were persons who did not subordinate the affiliation motive to the achievement motive.

NOTES

1. Clarke Fountain, "Plot Synopsis," www.allmovie.com. Accessed on Saturday, May 19, /ow.

a. Rachel Deahl, "Review," www.allmovie.com. Accessed on Saturday, May 19, 2001.

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