The Modularity of Mind |
Note functional architecture Dawson / MIT Encyclopedia. Applebaum's essay on M is very good in A Companion
Newell: "the notion of a complex process being achieved through the interaction of simpler subprocesses" (Companion, 11) presumably governed by a "goal"
ABSTRACT Fodor's view of the modularity of mind. Chomsky and modularity. Annette Karmiloff-Smith's developmental perspective on modularity. Domain specificity and mapping the mind. Lakoff and Johnson's Philosophy in the Flesh. Karmiloff-Smith's theory of cognitive modularity supports a theory of discursive modularity. There is abundant evidence of "discursive modularity." |
Fodor's view of the modularity of mind.
A chapter in A Companion to Cognitive Science is devoted to "Modualarity" authored by Irene Appelbaum (philosophy). She remarks: "some form of the modularity thesis is now a prominent, even dominant, view" (625). In exaplaining Fodor's synthesis of modularity theories prior to 1983, Appelbaum writes:
Functionally, he dstinguishes three kinds of meachanisms: (1) transducers, (2) modules, and (3) central systems. The functin of transducers is to receive energy impinging at the organism's surfaces and translate it into a respresentational form accessible by other psychology systems. The function of central systems is tt of interence and belief fixation. The function of modules is to mediate between transducers and central systems. Although this mediation may operate din either direction, Fofor discusses almost exclusiely modules which take transduced representations and infer hypotheses about their distal sources which then become available for use by central systems. More generally, Fodor (1983, p. 40) says, the function of such modules is "to present the world to thought." (626)
She notes that "the phrase 'modularity of mind' implies only that some processes (the perceptual ones) are accomplished by encapsulated mechanisms, not that the mind in general is modular" (627).
Because general systems are susceptible to "the frame problem," being isotropic and Quinean in character (627), the potentially relevant data they can bring to bear in a problem solving or inferential task must be "constrained" "non-arbitrarily" (628). However, Fodor's solution has "dire" implications. "Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science" (1983, p. 107) is based on the assumption that general cogntive systems being unencapsulated, isotropic, and Quinean, cannot be studied scientifically. Only modules like perception can.
A core assumption in Chomsky's view of language is that "the processes responsible for language production and perception, are largely innate and modular" (Applebaum, 629). Chomsky describes the language module as an indepdendent "mental organ." (Applebaum notes that cognitive linguists offer an alternative view, linking linguistic ability to more general cognitive abilities.)
Annette Karmiloff-Smith's developmental perspective on modularity
Annette Karmiloff-Smith acknowledges modules, but unlike Fodor, she "denies that they are innately specified in detail. Like Piaget, she advocates a strong developmental contribution to cognitive processing; but unlike him, she denies that development can be characterized in domain-gneral terms." Her modules are "domain-specific systems of knowledge" and her distinction between modules and central systems is less rigid— modular knowledge is used for cognitive purposes other than its application in its own domain (Applebaum, 634).
Lakoff and Johnson's Philosophy in the Flesh.
Karmiloff-Smith's theory of cognitive modularity supports a theory of discursive modularity.
From a communication perspective, the relations among discourses and cognitive processes is important to address in developing communication theory. However, since communication research draws its data from situated text/messaging, its primary data is socio-linguistic. In principle, a cognitive science of communication would attempt to match the socio-linguistic findings with the findings of pychologists and neurologists who study cognitive processes.
In this context, whereas the Fodor/Chomsky view of modularity does not, Karmiloff-Smith's theory of cognitive modularity supports a theory of discursive modularity.
There is abundant evidence of "discursive modularity." Whether it can be correlated to cognitive modularity is not clear. (However, some connection between cognitive abilities and representation in discourse exists.)
jjs
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