Thagard on the Mind |
ABSTRACT Cognitive science research issues that intersect with communication studies regard concepts, analogies, and images. The typical disciplines are included (adding robotics) and communication studies are not mentioned. Thagard's adherence to the computational model of the mind, which he calls CRUM, is very strong but he calls for expanding and supplementing it. The computational / connectionist controversy factors into his view but he is more concerned with various challenges to CRUM, not only from connectionist quarters. The future research directions he anticipates are directly related to responses to the challenges to CRUM. Thagard's view is balanced and sensible. |
cognitive science research areas related to communication
In Paul Thagard's Mind, CS examines how mental procedures have mental representations as outcomes.
Thagard organizes his chapters around these concepts, thinkers, & their methods:
- LOGIC — Frege-math, Russell-phil, Alonzo Church-logician & Turing-math, John McCathy-math&AI??) 24ff.
- RULES—Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, Herbert Simon-AI, ACT-John Anderson, SOAR-
Newell, Rosenbloom, Laird. (43ff.) - CONCEPTS—(frame, schema, and script theory) Minsky AI, Schank Abelson AI, Rumelhart-psych, Putnam-phil. (60ff.)
- ANALOGIES—Evans-computational model of analogizing, + Holyoak & Thagard, Gentner, & case based reasoning: Kolodner, Leake, Hoftstadtr, Mitchell. (77ff.)
- IMAGES—(computational models of visual imagery) Palvio, Shepard, Metzler, Kosslyn, Swartz, Funt. (95ff.)
- CONNECTIONS—computer models of neural networks: (111ff.)
His view of "concepts" comes closest to communication studies, but, aside from Schank & Abelson, the theoretical sources differ. "Analogies" is another area of instersection.
modularity of the mind
Thagard has nothing to say about the modularity of the mind.
disciplines included and excluded
Paul Thagard structures his Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science in terms of different approaches to the subject. This organization fits the course for which the book was written which includes students from a wide variety of departments. So, considering the following fields of study to comprise Cognitive Science--philosophy, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience, his chapters take up different "models" of thinking based on logic, rules, concepts, analogies, images, and connections that are associated with thinkers in the six fields. Thagard contends that the approaches are not competing but complementary ones (5).
He does not mention communication studies.
methods included and excluded
Though there is no exact correspondence between the field and the model, there are specific thinkers in each field whose work matches up with them. The philosopher Frege with formal logic, the linguist Chomsky with rules, the anthropolgist Geertz with analogies,
neuroscientists with connections. Of course, psychologists are associated with several models--concepts, analogies, images. AI thinkers fit logic and rules.
adherence to the computational model of the mind
Thagard sees the subject of Cognitive Science to be the "computational-representational understanding of mind"—CRUM (10ff.). "I have used the term, thinking, to summarize his view with the understanding that the ability to express our thoughts is implied."
His criteria for assessing the adquacy of each model are listed as follows:
- Representational power
- Computational power
- problem solving
- planning
- decision
- explanation
- learning
- language
- problem solving
- Psychological plausibility
- Neurological plausibility
- Practical applicability
- education
- design
- intelligent systems
- illness
His criteria reveal his view of thinking which is "computational." Granted that empirical findings in psychology and neurology provide a litness test, still they are judged with respect to their ability to model problem solving (planning, deciding, explaining), learning, and articulating thought. The articulation revoles around the ability to express plans, decisions, explanations.
the computational / connectionist controversy
This view of cognition is decidedly on the side of the computational-connnectionist debate. Thagard takes on the alternative view in the second section of his book. At the same time, he notes contrasting views of thinking that are alternatives to each other, usually models that are computational and models that are connectionist, a contrast that structures Michael Dawson's Understanding Cognitive Science. Dawson shares Thagard's view that the two models are not necessarily contradictory.
Thagard is quite open minded but wedded to computation since he researches in that area. At the same time, he has added to his research agenda work in neuroscience, albeit computational work.
Though he does not elaborate, he makes a nice distinction about how the various approaches will converge: by expanding and supplementing CRUM
For Thagard the "challenges for Cogntive Science are:
- The brain challenge CRUM ignores crucial facts about how thinking is performed by the brain.
- The emotion challenge CRUM neglects the important role of emotions in human thinking.
- The consciousness challenge CRUM ignores the importance of consciousness in thinking.
- The body challenge CRUM neglects the contribution of the body to human thought and action.
- The world challenge CRUM disregards the significant role of physical environments in human thinking.
- The dynamic systems challenge The mind is a dynamic system, not a computational system.
- The social challenge Human thought is inherently social in ways that CRUM ignores. (140)
"These challenges pose serious problem for CRUM and for the whole enterprise of cognitive science" (140). He suggests that there are four possible responses to these challenges: deny them, expand CRUM, supplement CRUM, abandon CRUM. His position is that CRUM needs to be expanded and supplemented, but that it should not be abandoned nor should the challenges be suppressed and disregarded (141). The second half of Mind takes up each of these challenges.
Unlike most overviews of CS which organize their chapters in terms of the various disciplines or mental functions, Thagard organizes Mind around the concepts: logic, rules. concepts, analogies, images, and connections. However, logic and images, for example, do not belong to the same "category." This would be fine had Thagard invoked Rosch or Lakoff to explain his choices, but he doesn't.
Instead he writes: "I have chosen a third approach, systematically describing and evaluating the main theories of mental representation that have been advocated by congitive scientists" (x). He refers to these concepts as "funadmental theoretical approaches" related to different fields that have contributed to CS.
His organization is intended to provide "a unified way of presenting the accomplishments of different fields of cogntive science to understanding various imporant mental functions" (x). But what does "a unified way" imply? Is it a composite of all approaches?
In his concluding chapter, "The Future of Cognitive Science," under the subheading "Integrations," Thagard writes:
I see three kinds of integrations that we can hope will continue. First, at the most general, conceptual level, we should encounter new cross-disciplinary integrations as reasearchers in pyschology, philosophy, artifical intelligence, anthropology, lilnguistics, and neuroscience continue to recognize the need to talk to each other and follow each other's work. ... Second, cognitive science should continue to witness experimental integrations, though difernt kinds of data collected by methods used in different disciplines. . . . The third kind of integration that cognitive science should continue to see is theoretical integration made possible by computational ideas and simulations.
- On supplementing CS
For Thagard, cognitive science has focused on “thinking.” However, communication is broader than thinking and includes the “body. Given Thagard's view that attention to the body, the encironmen, and the world are needed to supplement CS, the door is open for communication as a cognitive science…”
- On the significance of representation in CRUM
Thagard suggest that there are six theories of mental representations: logic, rules, concepts, analogies, images, connections. Logic, rules, concepts pertain to a mode of expression associated with necessity & probability. And that analogies, images, with possibility. The connectionist view is one that accounts for the particular combinations of operations in a procedure. (15-17). This relates to the notion of "modes of expression."
- On the notion of "recipes."
recipes as analogy for thinking. [This analogy works well for me. The recipe is a set of actions that have to be performed in combining the ingredients. Similarly a configuration is a set of actions whose combination results in an identifiable pattern of behavior. Recipe //s routines. The key difference from the computational model is the emphasis on language as a symbolic action.] (12)
jjs
Notes:
Cognitive anthropology looks at the functioning of the mind in different cultural settings (9)..| ... 
Thagard does cite Eleanor Rosch ("On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories") and George Lakoff (Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things) in his chapter on "Concepts." Mind (71 & 69 respectively). | ...
. That communication study has not taken intra-personal communication as its subject apparently removes it from contention | ...
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last revised:
September 13, 2007
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